La participación de las Fuerzas Armadas en los proyectos del populismo-nacionalista en América Latina (DT)
Sonia Alda Mejías, Real Instituto Elcano
Julio 30 de 2008                                                                              Ante la existencia de un problema común que, aunque en diferente medida, afecta a toda la región cabe preguntarse si en los cambios que están introduciendo los actuales populismos nacionalistas se contemplan alternativas que aseguren, en el ámbito de la defensa, el control civil de las Fuerzas Armadas.
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The Looming Crisis: Displacement and Security in Iraq
Elizabeth Ferris, Brookings
Agosto 2008                                                                              Lost in discussions of the military surge, the pace of troop drawdowns, and political benchmarks are millions of displaced Iraqi women, children, and men. Their plight is both a humanitarian tragedy and a strategic crisis that is not being addressed. The massive Iraqi displacement is like the proverbial elephant in the room: U.S. administration officials may acknowledge it as an important issue but lack a serious long-term plan to address the crisis. There is a risk that ignoring this humanitarian dimension will be yet another in a series of strategic blunders by the U.S. government with far-reaching political consequences. Present and future Iraqi displacement has the potential to change the Middle East landscape in unpredictably adverse ways. But if thoughtful policymakers—in the U.S. government, the U.N. system, and the non-governmental world—do not think strategically about Iraqi displacement, the implications for security in the region could be equally far-reaching.
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How Terrorist Groups End Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida
Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, RAND
Julio 15 2008                                                                               All terrorist groups eventually end. But how do they end? The evidence since 1968 indicates that most groups have ended because (1) they joined the political process (43 percent) or (2) local police and intelligence agencies arrested or killed key members (40 percent). Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups, and few groups within this time frame have achieved victory. This has significant implications for dealing with al Qa'ida and suggests fundamentally rethinking post-9/11 U.S. counterterrorism strategy: Policymakers need to understand where to prioritize their efforts with limited resources and attention.
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